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GALOOB VI NINTENDO: 
DERIVATIVE WORKS, FAIR USE & 




Because its boundaries are fixed by statute, copyright law 
has had great difficulty staying abreast of the dynamic growth 
of technology during the twentieth century. Computer tech-
nology has proven exceptionally problematic for Congress and 
the courts. Courts are reluctant to go beyond explicit legisla-
tive guidance, l a resource which has been scarce and excep-
tionally opaque. On Congress's behalf, the rapid advance of 
technology makes legislation with adequate foresight elusive. 
This Note will analyze the holding in Lewis Galoob Toys, 
Inc. v. Nintendo of America. 2 First a background of copyright 
law relevant to computer technology and video games will be 
developed.3 Emphasis will be placed on the issues surrounding 
exceptions to a copyright holder's exclusive rights and the 
enhancement of computer programs. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Congressional and judicial lack of familiarity with com-
puters has promulgated much of the confusion in the area of 
copyright law for computer technology. This lack offamiliari-
ty exacerbates the difficulties both institutions face when· 
1. See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 415 U.S. 394, 414 
(1974) (the court was particularly restrained because the copyright legislation at issue 
was enacted before the technology involved was even conceived). See also Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,431 (1984), rehearing denied, 465 U.S. 
1112 (1984) [hereinafter Sony]. MThejudiciary's reluctance to expand the protections 
afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance is a recurring theme.· 
1d. at 431. 
2. No. 90·1586 & 90·1440 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (WESTLA W 149826, Allfeds directory) 
[hereinafter Galoob]. 
3. See Stern Elecs. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852; 853 (2d Cir. 1982) (Video game 
defined as a computer programmed to create user manipulable images on a television 
screen. Video games thus involve a computer, computer program & a visual output.). 
489 
1
Kesler: Galoob v. Nintendo
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
490 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:489 
called upon to apply or modify copyright statutes to account for 
technology far more complex than that envisioned when the 
statutes were first constructed. In order to avoid similar con-
fusion a background of computer technology and copyright 
law will be provided. 
A. COMP6TERS & VIDEO GAMES 
An in depth look into the operations of computers is beyond 
the scope of this Note. However, some explanation is necessary 
to understand the manner in which the products at issue oper-
ate and in order to determine the applicable law. 
1. The Components 
Computer technology is usually placed into one of two cat-
egories, those being: "hardware,'" the physical components of 
a computer, and "software,"6 which is a general term encom-
passing computer programs in any of the variety of ways in 
which they may be stored. A simple way of viewing the inter-
action of the two is that the software consists of instructions 
telling the hardware what to do so as to accomplish some 
function for the user. 
2. Computer Programs 
A "computer program" is defined by the Copyright Act as "a 
set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly 
in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."s The set 
of instructions is known as the computer code or simply the 
code. 7 Computer programs must provide for user interaction 
and some form of output in order to be useful and manipula-
ble by the user. 
Video displays are the typical means by which the computer 
communicates with the user. Generally both the user's 
4. Hardware is defined as a computer and its associated physical apparatus. WEB-
STER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 565 (1984). 
5. Software is defined as recorded data, as programs, routines, and symbolic lan-
guages, requisite to computer operations. Id. at 1105. 
6. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1991). 
7. "Code- is further broken down into 'source code' which is written in a language 
readily understandable by computer programmers and 'object code' (binary) which is 
readily understood by computers. Typically the program is written in 'source code' and 
then converted to 'object code.' 
2
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commands to the computer and the product of the computer's 
operation are displayed on the video display. 
The computer program generates the visual display and dic-
tates the computer's operation. Computer programs have been 
divided by the courts into literal and nonliteral aspects. The 
computer program's code comprises the literal aspect. 8 The 
visual displays, interface, etc., are the nonliteral aspect.9 
3. Video Games 
A video game system is a computer dedicated to the single 
purpose of producing a visual output which the user can inter-
act with according to a set of rules, generally with a goal such 
as scoring points or staying alive. 10 Video games are comput-
er programs designed to allow the interaction of the player with 
the visual display th:rough the use of a joystick or other con-
troller. The video game therefore has literal aspects, the code, 
stored typically in "game cartridges" and nonliteral aspects, the 
characteristic video display. 
B. COPYRIGHT LAW 
1. History 
Congressional power to protect innovation through patents, 
trademarks, and copyrights stems directly from the 
Constitutionll which provides that "the Congress shall have 
Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 
Modern copyright law has evolved from the early protections 
of the Copyright Act of 1790,12 through the Copyright Act of 
1909,13 to the Copyright Act of 197614 as modified by a variety 
8. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 
1990). (also included in the nonliteral aspects are the structure, sequence and orga-
nization). See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1238 (3d 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). 
9. [d. 
10. See Stern Elecs., 669 F.2d at 852. 
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
12. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
13. Copyright Act of Mar. 4,1909, ch. 16,35 Stat. 1075. 
14. Copyright Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. 
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of amendments, the most significant here being the Computer 
Software Copyright Act of 1980.16 
Copyright law "is a means by which an important public 
purpose may be achieved. "16 Congress grants limited monopoly 
privileges to authors and inventors as an incentive for ardent 
endeavor, not as a "special private benefit. "17 Any reward is a 
secondary consideration.16 The Supreme Court has declared 
"[t]he sole interest of the United States and the primary object 
in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived 
by the public from the labors of authors. "19 
The Constitution makes Congress responsible for deter-
mining the scope and protection to be afforded copyright hold-
ers. The judiciary's role in copyright law has been limited, 
with the court acknowledging early on that copyright protec-
tion is wholly statutory.20 
Such deference is entirely appropriate as these decisions 
involve exactly the kind of balancing test between competing 
interests that the legislative body was designed to make. "In 
enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ... two 
questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the 
producer and so benefit the public; and, second, how much will 
the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public?"21 In grant-
ing copyright protections a balance is struck between a tem-
porary monopoly, and the benefit which society will receive from 
the products stimulated through such protections.22 
Recognition of the variety of issues arising from the com-
puter market led Congress to create the National Commission 
15. Pub. L. No. 96~517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (made significant contri-
butions such as adding a definition of a 'computer program'). See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980). 
16. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429. 
17. [d. 
18. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). 
19. [d. 
20. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591,661-62 (1834). 
21. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909). 
22. See Lotus Dev. Corp., 740 F. Supp. 37. "Copyright monopolies are not grant-
ed for the purpose of rewarding authors. Rather, Congress has granted copyright 
monopolies to serve the public welfare by encouraging authors (broadly defined) to gen-
erate new ideas and disclose them to the public, being free to do so in any uniquely 
expressed way they may choose. [Citation omitted] ... The immediate effect of our copy-
right law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim 
is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. 
[Citation omitted].~ [d. at 52-53. 
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on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU).2s 
CONTU's Final Report was influential in creating the 
Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980. 
2. Scope 
a. Expression v. Idea 
"[O]riginal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medi-
um of expression" qualify for protection under copyright law.u 
It is well established that copyright protection extends only to 
the expression of an idea, not the idea itself.26 This distinction 
was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976.26 While appealingly 
elegant, application of this distinction has proven problematic.27 
b. Derivative Works 
Among the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders is 
the right to prepare derivative works28 which are defined as 
23. The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted 
Works, Final Report (1979) [hereinafter CONTU Final Report]. 
24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
25. See Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
26. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)m,. "In no case does copyright protection •.. extend to any 
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discov-
ery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embod-
ied in such a work." Id. 
27. See Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 
1960). "Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond 
copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore 
inevitably be ad hoc." Id. (emphasis in original). 
A corollary to the idea/expression distinction is the merger doctrine which dic-
tates that when an idea can be expressed in a single or very limited number of ways, 
the idea "merges" with the expression and copyright protection will not be afforded 
to either. See Broderbund Software v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (N.D. 
Cal. 1986). See also Lotus Dev. Corp., 740 F. Supp. at 37; Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 
1237. The audiovisual portions of a program are generally treated as expression and 
not idea because different programs can produce the same video output. See M. 
Kramer Mfg. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986). However, in some instances 
courts have found that the idea, see Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 
(9th Cir. 1988) «at issue were two video games based on karate matches) The court 
found that "the visual depiction of karate matches is subject to the constraints inher-
ent in the sport of karate itself." Id. at 209.) or external factors, see Plains Cotton Coop. 
Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1987), rehearing 
denied, 813 F.2d 407 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987) (holding that the struc-
ture and organization of a computer program to provide information to farmers about 
the cotton market might be dictated by the cotton market), limits the forms of expres-
sion and so merger becomes an issue. 
28. Subject to §§ 107-20, the copyright owner has the exclusive rights to do and 
to authorize; reproductions of the work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, 
perform the work publicly, or display the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1991). 
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a work based upon one or more preexisting 
works, such as a translation, musical 
arrangement, dramatization, fictionaliza-
tion, motion picture version, sound recording, 
art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, 
or any other form in which a work may be 
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work con-
sisting of editorial revisions, annotations, 
elaborations, or other modifications which, as 
a whole, represent an original work of 
authorship, is a "derivative work."29 
Two cases have helped refine the definition of derivative 
works in the video game context. The first case, Midway 
Manufacturing v. Artic International~ Inc.,30 involved a board31 
placed into the arcade video arcade game32 "Galaxian" in order 
to speed up play.33 Midway held the speeded-up version of 
"Galaxian" was a derivative work.34 The Midway court added 
an equitable/economic analysis to the determination of what 
is a derivative work.36 The pivotal factor in the determina-
tion was the potential for economic benefit to the arcade 
licensee.36 
Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel Learning Systems,37 fol-
lowed a similar analysis. At issue in Worlds of Wonder was the 
"Teddy Ruxpin" talking bear whose mouth, eyes and limbs move 
in synchronization to its voice giving the impression the bear is 
telling the story contained on special tape cassettes.sa The audio-
visual work created was copyrighted by Worlds of Wonder, Inc.39 
29. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
30. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983) 
[hereinafter Midway]. 
31. A piece of hardware to be placed inside a computer typically intended to 
alter or augment the computer's functioning. The defendant's board replaced one of 
the boards in the original "Galaxian- arcade game. 
32. Arcade video games are free standing machines containing a computer 
system dedicated to running a single game when currency is inserted. 
33. Midway, 704 F.2d at 1010. 
34. 1d. at 1014. 
35. 1d. at 1009. 
36. 1d. at 1014 (the court differentiated speeded-up video games and speeded-up 
phonographs on the potential for a separate market noting, "[a] speeded-up video game 
is a SUbstantially different product from the original game.- The speeded-up version 
could generate profits which should go to the copyright holder, and the defendant was 
trying to piggyback on the success of another's copyrighted product). 
37. 658 F. Supp. 351, 356 (N.D. Tex. 1986). 
38. 1d. at 352. 
39. 1d. at 353. 
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Veritel produced cassettes which worked in a similar manner 
when inserted in the "Teddy Ruxpin" talking bear.40 Veritel's 
tapes were found to be derivative works.4l As with Midway, the 
Worlds of Wonder court was persuaded by the fact the product 
could only be used in conjunction with the plaintiff's copy-
righted product and was trying to capitalize on the latter's suc-
cess. 42 
c. Literal v. Nonliteral Aspects 
A computer program's literal aspects are protected under 
the classification of literary works,43 which are "works, other 
than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other 
verbal or numerical symbols .... ,,« 
The video display of computer programs, i.e., the nonliteral 
aspects are audiovisual works which are "works that consist of 
a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be 
shown by the use of machines or devi-ces such as ... electronic 
equipment, together with accompanying sounds .... ,,46 Audiovisual 
works are specifically excluded from the category of literary 
works.46 There is an established line of cases recognizing that 
video games are copyrightable as audiovisual works.47 The respec-
tive copyrightability of the literal and nonliteral aspects of com-
puter programs has plagued the courts and added a great deal of 
confusion to copyright law for computer programs.46 
40. ld. (Worlds of Wonder, Inc. alleged Veriters tapes produced audiovisual 
works which were substantially similar to those to which they owned the copyrights. 
Further, plaintiff alleged the tapes altered the display so as to take "Teddy Ruxpin" 
out of the "World of Teddy Ruxpin.") 
41. ld. at 356. 
42.ld. 
43. "[A] computer program, whether in object code or source code, is a 'literary 
work.' " Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983), 
rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). 
44. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
45.ld. 
46.ld. 
47. Midway, 704 F.2d at 1012 (citing Williams Elecs. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 
870 (3d Cir. 1982); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs., 672 F.2d 607 (7th 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Stern Elecs. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 
(2d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981)). 
48. It is well established that the literal aspects, i.e. the computer code, can be 
afforded copyright protection. See Lotus Del). Corp., 740 F. Supp. 37. 
The courts have had much greater difficulty determining the protection to be 
afforded to the nonliteral aspects of computer programs. There are two competing the-
ories on copyrighting the nonliteral aspects of programs. The first theory espouses that 
the copyright of the computer program extends to the nonliteral aspects it creates. The 
second theory is that the nonliteral aspects produced by the program are separate 
works which are independently copyrightable. 
7
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3. Exceptions 
a. Fair Use - § 107 
The fair use doctrine49 is an equitable rule which "allows a 
holder of the privilege to use copyrighted material in a rea-
sonable manner without the consent of the copyright owner."60 
Section 107 codifies the judicial fair use doctrine and pro-
vides four factors61 to be considered when determining whether 
the fair use privilege is available 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commer-
cial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
uses;63 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;63 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole;64 and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the poten-
tial market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.66 
There are only two opinioned cases by the Supreme Court 
on the fair use doctrine, Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios66 
As of June 3, 1988 the Copyright Office ceased to accept separate applications for 
the literal and nonliteral aspects of a single computer program. Abraham & Wessels, 
Current Judicial Developments in Copyright Protection for Computer Software, 275 
PRAC. L. INST .!PAT. 179, 182 (1989). "The Office has decided generally to require that 
all copyrightable expression embodied in a computer program, including computer 
screen displays, and owned by the claimant, be registered on a single application form.· 
Id. The Copyright Office left the determination as to whether to copyright the program 
as a literary work or as an audiovisual work with the applicant, the choice to be made 
based on the predominate nature of the work.ld. ·Ordinarily, where computer pro-
grams authorship is part of the work,literary authorship will predominate, and one 
registration should be made on Form TX. Where, however, audiovisual authorship pre-
dominates, the registration should be made on Form PA.-Id. The Copyright Office did 
note that generally computer programs would be viewed as literary works. Id. 
49. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (judicially rec-
ognizing the fair use doctrine). 
50. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989). 
51. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
52. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
53. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2). 
54. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
55. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
56. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). In Sony, Universal City Studios and Walt Disney 
Productions, owners of copyrights on several television programs which were broad-
8
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and Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises 67 Both deci-
sions were based on the four fair use factors provided in sec-
tion 107.68 Sony is the only fair use case in a contributory 
infringement context. 
(1) Purpose and Character 
The discussion of the purpose and character of an infring-
ing use has become an investigation into whether the use is 
for profit or nonprofit. 69 This factor is given a great deal of 
weight, with a presumption of fairness or unfairness hang-
ing in the balance.6o Proof of harm or market loss is required 
in the case of nonprofit uses. 61 This rule serves the purpose 
of copyright law which is to encourage innovation and dis-
tribute its benefits to the public.62 In addition, Harper & Row 
examined whether the user stood to benefit by the infringe-
ment without having paid the copyright holder the normal 
dues. 63 
cast over public airwaves, alleged the use of Sony's Betamax to tape copyrighted pro-
grams was an infringement in violation of section 106 and that selling the Betamax 
to the public constituted contributory infringement.Id. at 417. The court considered 
the four section 107 factors and concluded that taping and time-shifting by home users 
for personal use was a privileged fair use. Id. at 455 . 
. 57. 471 U.S. 539 (1985) [hereinafter Harper & Row]. At issue in Harper & Row 
were excerpts from an unpublished work by Gerald Ford which were published in The 
Nation as a scoop of a soon to be released book. 
In a six to three decision the Supreme Court held public interest in the subject 
matter did not make the unauthorized copying of parts of an unpublished manuscript 
into a fair use. Id. at 569. 
58. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 455; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549-55. 
59. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-52; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561-62. 
60. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. "[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is pre-
sumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege ..... Id. 
61. Id. at 451. "A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work 
requires proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become 
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work." 
Id. 
62. Id. at 450. "The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative 
effort .... But a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, 
or the value of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the 
author's incentive to create" Id. 
63. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562. "The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction 
is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands 
to profit from the exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary 
price." Id. The court applied this test in considering that The Nation had profited from 
its use of the excerpts and had not paid the customary serialization fees.Id. This test 
is consistent with the analysis in Sony where the court noted the television broadcasters 
invited viewers to watch the TV presentations in their entirety for free. Sony, 464 U.S. 
at 449. 
9
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(2) Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
Discussion of this factor has centered around two distinc-
tions. The most important is whether the work is published.
64 
The court has weighed an author's right to first publication to 
be very important and as such unpublished works are afford-
ed a greater measure of protection.66 Hence, infringement of an 
unpublished work weighs heavily against a finding of fair use.66 
The second distinction is between fact and fiction. The 
public need to have factual material disseminated is deemed 
to be greater and thus use of factual material will weigh 
toward a finding of fair use.67 
(3) Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
This factor is a quantitative and qualitative examination 
of the material infringed. Application of this standard has 
been a vague investigation of the percentage and importance 
of the portions copied.66 
While earlier courts generally held that copying an entire 
work was presumptively unfair,69 the Sony court held that because 
the public had been invited to watch the entire broadcast for free, 
the normal presumption against fair use did not apply. 70 
(4) Effect on the Market 
This factor is "undoubtedly the single most important ele-
ment of fair use."71 The Harper & Row court went so far as to 
64. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564. "The fact that a work is unpublished is a crit-
ical elem,ent of its "nature."" Id. 
65. Id. at 564. "[T]he author's right to control the first public appearance of his 
expression weighs against [infringing] prerelease of the work before its release." Id. 
66. Id. "[T]he scope offair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works." 
Id. 
67. Id. at 563. 
68. Id. at 564-65. Thirteen percent of The Nation article came from the unpub-
lished manuscript and the article was constructed around the infringing portions. In 
Harper & Row the court found that the words quoted were an insubstantial portion 
quantitatively but were "essentially the heart of the book." 
69. Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937). "[Wlholesale 
copying and publication of copyrighted material can [n]ever be fair use." Id. 
70. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50. "[T]ime-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such 
a work which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that 
the entire work is reproduced, see § 107(3), does not have its ordinary effect ofmili-
tating against a finding of fair use." Id. 
71. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. 
10
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declare "[flair use, when properly applied, is limited to copy-
ing by others which does not materially impair the mar-
ketability of the work which is copied. "72 Fair use can be 
negated not only by showing actual harm but by showing an 
adverse affect to potential markets73 or to markets for deriva-
tive works. 74 Indeed a plaintiff must only "show[] by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of 
future harm exists" to bar a finding of fair use.76 
The relevant inquiry is whether the use "supplants any part 
of the normal market for a copyrighted work"78 or "whether it 
fulfills the demand for the original?"77 A fair use may sup-
press demand but may not usurp it.78 The supplant/suppress 
distinction is in effect a directlindirect test. It is not an infringe-
ment to write a bad review which may destroy demand but it 
is an infringement if a parody competes in the same market as 
the original work. 79 The rationale is that "[t]he copyright laws 
are intended to prevent copiers from taking the owner's intel-
lectual property, [citation omitted], and are not aimed at rec-
ompensing damages which may flow indirectly from copying."80 
b. Section 117 
Section 117 provides another important exception in the 
area of computer programs.81 Section 117 allows the owner of 
a copyrighted computer program to make or authorize the 
72. "[O]nce a copyright holder establishes with reasonable probability the exis-
tence of a causal connection between the infringement and a loss of revenue, the bur-
den properly shifts to the infringer to show that this damage would have occured had 
there been no taking of copyrighted expression." 1d. at 567 (quoting 1 Nimmer § 
1.10[D], at 1-87). 
73. "[T]o negate fair use one need only show that if the challenged use should 
become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copy-
righted work." Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. 
74. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (construing, Iowa State Univ. Research 
Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980». 
75. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (emphasis in original). "If the intended use is for 
commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial 
purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated." 1d. 
76. Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 1983). 
77. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432,438 (9th Cir. 1986). 
78. Mere injury is not determinative. The copy must compete, not just have the 
potential to destroy the market. 1d. 
79.1d. 
80. Consumers Union v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 
1984), rehearing denied, 730 F.2d 47 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984). 
81. 17 U.S.C. § 117. 
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making of a copy or adaptation as "an essential step in the uti-
lization of the computer program"82 or for archival purposes.83 
The alienability of these copies of adaptations is restricted; 
copies may be sold along with a sale of the entire program,84 but 
adaptations may only be sold with the permission of the copy-
right holder.86 
Program owners may copy or adapt "as an essential step 
in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction 
with a machine. "88 Portions of computer programs are rou-
tinely copied into memory in the course of running the pro-
gram. Some courts have narrowly construed section 117, 
holding it only authorizes such copies.87 Subsequently it has 
been held "section 117 should be given a broader reading 
where the owner of a copy of a computer program adapts it 
for his own internal use. "88 Among the explicitly mentioned 
examples of permissible adaptation is the addition of new fea-
tures.89 This explicit recognition of the right to add features 
was initially accompanied by a substantial caveat, "the 
adaptation must be necessary to allow use of the program for 
the purpose for which it was purchased. "90 This restriction 
was rejected by the Court of Appeals in Vault Corp. v. Quaid 
Software Limited. 91 
82. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1). 
83. 17 U .S.C. § 117(2). 
84. "Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section 
may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such 
copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in 
the program." 17 U.S.C. § 117. 
85. "Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of 
the copyright owner." 1d. 
86. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1). 
87. See Apple Computerv. Formula Int'l, 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1984). Micro-
Sparc Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984). 
88. RAV Comms. v. Phillip Bros., No. 88 Civ. 3366 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (WESTLAW 
36174, 36177, Allfeds directory). In coming to this conclusion the court distinguished 
Apple Computer and Micro·Sparc as applying in the context of "schemes to allow unre-
stricted duplication of computer programs for distribution to third parties.· 
89. 1d. at 36177 (citing CONTU Final Report). The CONTU Final Report is 
regarded as an expression oflegislative intent by the courts. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. 
Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); Micro-Sparc Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 
592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984); Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 
1006 (D. Kan. 1989». 
90. 1d. at 36177. 
91. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). "Section 117(1) contains no language to suggest 
that the copy it permits must be employed for a use intended by the copyright owner, 
and, absent clear congressional guidance to the contrary, we refuse to read such 
limiting language into this exception." 1d. at 261. 
12
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A lessor restriction was adopted in Foresight Resources 
Corp. u. Pfortmiller92 which dictated the right to adapt could 
only be used so long as the interests of the copyright holder 
were not harmed.93 Foresight reasoned a broad construction of 
section 117 fulfilled CONTU's intent, followed judicial trends,s' 
and served important copyright goals.9s 
Foresight also addressed computer program owners autho-
rizing adaptations. The court concluded that "section 117 
should not be restricted to prohibit owners from authorizing 
custom-made enhancements to their copies of copyrighted pro-
grams."96 If computer program owner could not authorize third 
parties to enhance their programs then the right would be 
illusory for the great majority of computer user because they 
lack the ability to make such adaptations themselves.97 
The confusion surrounding distinctions between computer 
programs, the audiovisual works they produce, and the copy-
rightability of each becomes critical in the section 117 arena. 
Section 117's application is limited to computer programs and 
thus strictly speaking does not authorize adaptation or 
enhancement of audiovisual works.98 The right to adapt the 
underlying computer program could once again be rendered 
illusory if resulting changes to the audiovisual work produced 
are held to be copyrightinfringements. This issue has not yet 
been directly addressed by the courts. 
III. OPINION OF THE COURT 
A. THE FACTS 
This case considered the interaction the Nintendo 
Entertainment System (hereinafter "NES"), Nintendo game 
cartridges and the Galoob Game Genie. 
92. 719 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Kan. 1989) [hereinafter Foresight]. 
93. [d. at 1009. 
94. [d. (endorsing e.g.,Yault Corp., 847 F.2d 255j RA V Comms., No. 88 Civ. 3366 
(WESTLAW at 36177, Allfeds directory». 
95. "[A]llowing sophisticated software users to enhance copies of copyrighted 
programs they have purchased eliminates the need to choose between either buying the 
latest version of a program or possibly infringing the program's owner's copyright. At 
the same time, allowing such enhancements to be used only in-house preserves the mar-
ket for improvements made by the copyright holder: Foresight, 719 F. Supp. at 1010. 
96. [d. at 1010. 
97. [d. In doing so the Foresight court explicitly contradicted earlier cases hold-
ing it to be contributory infringement for a third party to adapt a computer program 
for the owner of the program.ld. at 1009. Such a holding would put the right to adapt 
computer programs beyond the grasp of the great majority of computer program 
owners. [d. at 1010. 
98. 17 U.S.C. § 117. See also Midway, 704 F.2d at 1012. 
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1. The Nintendo Entertainment System 
The NES consists of a microprocessor99 based "Control 
Deck" which connects to a home television or monitor. The 
Control Deck consists essentially of a central processing unit 
(CPU) controlling the system's operation and a picture pro-
cessing unit (PPU) which controls the display to the 
television. 100 
The NES games cartridges consist of Read Only Memory 
chips containing the computer program and the audiovisual 
works. IOI The game cartridge is plugged into the Control Deck 
which displays the audiovisual work on a television. l02 Players 
interact with the game through the use of provided control pads 
or accessories such as joysticks. 103 The cartridges contain a "pro-
gram memory" which is processed through the CPU and a 
"character memory" which processed through the PPU.I04 
Nintendo has produced hundreds of games for use with 
the NES system. 106 Sixty-three companies are licensed to pro-
duce compatible games, another eight companies produce 
games without a license. lOS In total more than 500 hundred 
games have been produced for use with the NES.l07 
Games typically involve a character operating in a world in 
which he must overcome obstacles, fight battles, and determine 
the optimal route through the various levels of the world while 
working toward the ultimate goal of finishing the game before 
losing a set number of lives. 108 
2. The Game Genie 
The Game Genie is designed to be inserted in between a 
game cartridge and the NES Control Deck. 109 The game is first 
99. Defined as a semiconductor central processing unit usually contained on a . 
single integrated circuit chip. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DIC-
TIONARY 565 (1984). In anthropomorphized terms, the brain of the computer. 





105. [d. Nintendo's early games, including many at issue in the present case, are 
copyrighted both as computer programs and as audiovisual works. As noted earlier the 




109. [d. at 149829. 
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plugged into the Game Genie and then the Game Genie is 
plugged into the Control Deck. Galoob describes the Game 
Genie as a "video game enhancer."l1o Its only function is to 
interact with the NES and compatible games.111 
The Game Genie operates in the following manner. The pro-
gramming phase starts upon pushing the start button on the 
Control Deck with the appearance of the Game Genie set-up 
screen which allows the player to input up to three wishes. 112 
The player then presses the select button and the normal 
opening screen for the game appears and the game proceeds as 
modified by the Game Genie. 113 
Galoob provides a booklet, the "Programming Manual and 
Code Book" containing over 1600 wishes. ll' Each wish is accom-
panied by a code which is input during the programming phase 
in order to effect the corresponding wish. The Code Book 
encourages players to use these codes and to experiment to find 
new codes. 116 The codes result in a variety of effects such as pro-
viding more or fewer lives, starting at advanced levels, skip-
ping certain obstacles etc. llS Players can connect multiple 
Game Genies together and enter more codes, i.e., 2 Game 
Genies will accept up to 6 codes. 
The Game Genie functions by intercepting requests from the 
CPU to the computer program and inserting a different value 
than the one contained in the computer program on the game car-
tridge or by accessing a different area of the computer program. 
The Game Genie is marketed for use by consumers as an 
accessory to their NES.117 It can only be used in conjunction with 
the NES. It has no independent purpose, and cannot take the 
place of a game cartridge· or make a duplicate. Any effects 
last only so long as power is not interrupted or play reset.118 The 
codes Will not alter the plot, theme or characters of the game. 119 
110. Nintendo Complaint For Copyright and Trademark Infringement at 4, 
Galoob, No. 90-1586 & 90-1440 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (WESTLAW 149826, Allfeds directory). 
'111. Galoob, No. 90-1586 & 90-1440 (WESTLAW at 149829, Allfeds directory). 
112. 1d. 
113. 1d. 
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The game cartridge is not altered in any way, and may be 
played normally by disconnecting the Game Genie and rein-
serting the game cartridge into the Control Deck.120 
3. Nintendo Accessories and Publications 
Nintendo markets accessories such as the NES Advantage 
which alter game play in ways similar to the Game Genie. 121 
Nintendo also publishes Nintendo Power Magazine which pro-
vides lists of secret codes which effect modifications similar to 
the Game Genie's, including the ability to skip levels and gain 
extra lives. m 
B. THE HOLDINGS 
The court made two substantive holdings: 123 1) Use of the 
Game Genie by consumers to temporarily alter copyrighted 
video games for their own enjoyment does not create a deriva-
tive work under Title 17 United States Code Section 101. 
Because the consumers are not direct infringers, Galoob is 
not a contributory infringer, 2) In the alternative, even if the 
Game Genie did create a derivative product, the doctrine of 
"fair use" enables consumers to use the Game Genie for their 
personal enjoyment, Title 17 United States Code Section 107, 
and therefore allows Galoob to sell it. 
1. The Game Genie does not create a derivative work. 
The court first analyzed Nintendo's claim that the Game 
Genie creates derivative works, a right which is given exclu-
sively to the copyright holder.124 Nintendo contended the Game 
Genie allowed home users to make "elaborations or other mod-
ifications, which, as a whole represent an original work of 
authorship. "125 . 
Galoob first noted that Midway stated the derivative work 
definition of section 101 had to be stretched to accommodate 
120. [d. 
121. [d. at 149839. The NES Advantage provides slow motion play and extra fire 
power, making game play easier. [d. 
122. [d. 
123. [d. at 149826. 
124. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). 
125. Nintendo's Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion For a 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 10, Galoob, No. 90-
1586 & 90-1440 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (WESTLAW 149826, Allfeds directory). 
16
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss2/11
1992] GALOOB V. NINTENDO 505 
speeded-up video games128 and then distinguished Midway as 
having been decided upon an equitable determination that 
the speed-up kit was yielding revenue to the licensee arcade 
owner which should have accrued to the copyright holder. 127 In 
contrast, the court noted, the Game Genie. is used for "non-
commercial, private enjoyment. "128 
The court then sidestepped the issue of whether enhanced 
video games in general were derivative works by holding the 
Copyright Act and the policies behind it made "inherent in the 
concept of a "derivative work" [] the ability for that work to exist 
on its own, fixed and transferable from the original work, i.e., 
having a separate "form.""129 The Game Genie temporarily 
modified but did not create a fixed independent work. As a 
result the Game Genie did not satisfy the definition of a deriva-
tive work. 130 
2. The Game Genie Qualifies for Protection as a Fair Use. 
After supplying a background of the fair use privilege the 
court considered each of the section 107 factors in turn. 131 In 
doing so the court considered the fairness of the family's use of 
the Game Genie with their video game, not the fairness of 
Galoob marketing a product to enhance Nintendo games.132 
a. Purpose and Character 
Noting a legislative and judicial reluctance to "carry copy-
right enforcement into the home," and analogizing to the use 
126. Midway, 704 F.2d at 1014. The court first stated it was not obvious from the 
language of section 101 that a speeded up video game was a derivative work, analo-
gizing to a speeded up phonograph which it held probably was not a derivative work. 
127. See Galoob, No. 90-1586 & 90-1440 (WESTLAW at 149829, Allfeds directory). 
"The [Midway] result appeared to be based on the equities of the situation .... 
Midway'S result, if not its analysis, appears to have turned on the fact that the 
licensee arcade owner, not the copyright holder, was making money from the public 
performance of the altered game .... " [d. 
128. "Any modification is for the consumer's own enjoyment in the privacy of the 
home." [d. at 149832. 
129. [d. 
130. [d. at 149833. 
131. [d. at 149833-35. 
132. [d. at 149833. "Fair use is a privilege against a direct infringement claim 
17 U.S.C. § 107, and is a privilege held in the first instance by the alleged direct 
infringer-i.e., by the person playing the video game. Just as application of the fair 
use doctrine in Sony resulted in substantial economic gain for Sony and other VCR 
manufacturers, the fair use doctrine applied to this case will benefit Galoob. Sony 
makes clear, however, that it is the fairness of the family's use of its video game, not 
some evaluation of the commercial "fairness· of Galoob's product, that must guide the 
Court's analysis.· [d. 
17
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of VCRs to time shift television programs for home enjoy-
ment, the court found that "a family's use of a Game Genie for 
private home enjoyment must be characterized as a noncom-
mercial, nonprofit activity."133 The noncommerical character of 
the family use of the Game Genie established a presumption 
of fair use. 134 
b. Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
Nintendo has published millions of copies of its games and 
freely sells them to anyone willing to pay.186 The Game Genie 
can only be used in conjunction with one of these published 
copies and thus the Game Genie user must first purchase the 
published Nintendo game.186 Noting the unpublished nature of 
the excerpts at issue in Harper & Row187 had been a "critical ele-
ment," the court found the published nature of the Nintendo 
games supported a finding of fair use. 138 
c. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
Holding the Sony decision to be dispositive the court found 
the incorporation of entire Nintendo games did not weigh 
against a finding of fair use.139 In Sony the viewers had been 
invited to watch the entire television program free of charge. 140 
The Nintendo games had to be purchased so the owner was 
entitled to use the entire work. W "Because the game owner is 
entitled to use the entire work, no matter what the "amount and 
substantiality" of his use, the third factor cannot ... overcom[e] 
the presumption of fair use. "142 
d. Effect on the Market 
Applying the suppress/supplant distinction the court found 
that even widespread use of the Game Genie could not supplant 
demand for the games because the Game Genie can only be 
operated in conjunction with a game cartridge. l43 




137. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539. 
138. Galoob, No. 90-1586 & 90-1440 (WESTLAW at 149834, Allfeds directory). 
139. [d. at 149835. 
140. Sony, 417 U.S. at 449. 
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Nintendo failed to show any reasonable likelihood it would 
market slightly altered gamest« or that it might wish to re-
release altered versions of the game in the future. t46 
Nintendo also failed to show the Game Genie would harm 
sales of Nintendo gameS. 14e A consumer study of the Game 
Genie done in Canada, Nintendo's inability to provide empir-
ical evidence of harm, and an expert witness led the court to 
conclude that if anything the use of video games would increase 
as a result of the Game Genie. l " 
e. Summary 
The noncommercial nature of the use of the Game Genie 
within the home creates a presumption of fair use. t48 The pub-
lished nature of the video game and the right of the game 
owner to use the entire game weigh in favor of fair use. 149 
Nintendo failed to show injury. 160 Therefore, even if the Game 
Genie produces a derivative work, players would be shielded 
from a direct infringement claim by the doctrine of fair use, cut-
ting off any contributory infringement claims.161 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. THE HOLDINGS 
1. The Game Genie does not create a derivative work. 
Galoob significantly refines the definition of derivative 
word by explicitly requiring a derivative work have a separate, 
fixed and transferable, form. 162 
Galoob purports to distinguish Nintendo's authority by 
distinguishing Midway as involving a licensee reaping profits 
which should have accrued to the copyright holder and thus dis-
similar from a consumer using the Game Genie for private 
enjoyment. 163 In doing so the court declined to address Worlds 
144. Id. at 149836. 
145. Id. at 149837. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 149838. 
148. Id. at 149842. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. [d. at 149843. 
152. Id. at 149833. 
153. Id. 
19
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of Wonder which Nintendo cited in support of its position that 
the Game Genie created a derivative work.164 
Worlds of Wonder cannot be distinguished in the same 
fashion because Veritel's cassettes altered a product to be 
used in the home in a fashion very similar to the Game Genie, 
i.e., the consumer used the cassettes for noncommercial, pri-
vate enjoyment. ISG Further, Veritel and Galoob can both fairly 
be characterized as trying to ride the coattails of another's 
success. 
Worlds of Wonder can be distinguished because the Veritel 
tapes constituted a fixed, transferable work. The Veritel cas-
settes were a separately marketable item producing a fixed 
audiovisual display when inserted in the Teddy Ruxpin bear. 166 
The Game Genie does not produce a fixed audiovisual dis-
play, it enables the video game owner to make a plethora of 
modifications at their discretion. 
Arguably, Worlds of Wonder was incorrectly decided. The 
implication of finding that any tape which could operate in the 
Teddy Ruxpin bear was a derivative work is that the bear 
itself constituted the most important part of the audiovisual 
work. An alternate view would be that the tape contains the 
audiovisual work and the bear is merely a mechanical vehicle 
for the presentation. This could be compared to a normal tape 
player and the music on the tape cassettes. Arguably Veritel 
created a new audiovisual work to displayed through Worlds 
of Wonder's vehicle. 
This alternate interpretation would better serve the purpose 
of copyright law. Worlds of Wonder would still be able to pro-
tect its own tapes but could not prevent others from providing 
alternate works for public consumption. The Worlds of Wonder 
decision leaves open the possibility of new technologies being 
restricted to one company.167 
154. Nintendo's Amended Memorandum of Law in Support oC Its Motion For a 
Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary lI\iunction at 12, Galoob, No. 90·1586 
& 90·1440 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (WESTLAW 149826, AllCeds directory). 
155. See Worlds of Wonder, 658 F. Supp. at 351. 
156. [d. 
157. Consider the inventor of a new technology such as CDs marketing a few 
albums and then claiming anyone else's CDs are derivative works. Such technology 
is more appropriately dealt with under patent law. This encourages the develop. 
ment of technology and promotes its exploitation once developed. 
20
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Galoob makes an appropriate and logical refinement of 
the definition of derivative work, furthering the purpose of 
copyright law. The protection afforded derivative works is 
provided in a construction parallel to the rights to make or dis-
tribute copies, or display or perform a work. 158 Implied in each 
is the concept of a distinguishable work. Similarly, the exam-
ples provided in the definition159 all possess a separate form 
from the original work and are able to exist separately. 
This linguistic approach is supported by a broader exami-
nation of the construction and purpose of copyright protection. 
Copyright law functions by affording the copyright holder an 
economic incentive in order to stimulate innovation. This is 
done to serve the public. The protections afforded, i.e., limit-
ed monopolies, are generally repugnant and are only afforded 
so long as they serve to stimulate innovation and do not over-
burden the dissemination of such innovation to the public. 
Consider the suppress/supplant distinction of the fair use 
doctrine. A work which has no transferable form can never sup-
plant demand for a product, as it cannot compete in the mar-
ketplace. 
2. The Game Genie Qualifies for Protection as a Fair Use 
The court's analysis of fair use was a straightforward appli-
cation of the four statutory factors of section 107 as inter-
preted by Sony. Galoob closely follows the footsteps of Sony, 
refusing to extend copyright enforcement into the home. 16o 
The arguments of fair use for the Game Genie are in several 
ways stronger than for the use of VCR's considered in Sony. 
First, the NES and Game Genie are exclusively used in the 
home. VCRs are capable of public display of copyrighted works 
or copying for distribution, either of which would be definite 
copyright infringements not protected by the fair use doc-
trine. Sony avoided these uses by holding that VCRs were 
also used for time-shifting programs.161 In determining that fair 
use was applicable only time-shifting was considered. 
158. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
159. 17 U.S.C. § 101. (for example translation, musical arrangement, dramati-
zation, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
abridgment, condensation). 
160. Galoob, No. 90-1586 & 90-1440 (WESTLAW at 149834, Allfeds directory). 
161. Sony, 417 U.S. at 442. 
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Second, to use the Game Genie a published Nintendo game 
had to be purchased. In Sony the viewers had not paid to see 
the broadcasts. This ties into the quantity argument. Once the 
game was purchased the owner could use itin its entirety as 
they saw fit. Having purchased the copyrighted work, the 
game' owner's rights were if anything superior to the rights of 
the home viewers with regard to the television broadcast. 
Last, since the Game Genie must work with a game car-
tridge, it cannot supplant demand for game cartridges. It can 
only alter games, not replace them. In Sony, a strong argument 
could have been made that VCRs supplant demand. If a per-
son can only afford to watch television two hours a day switch-
es to watching videotapes, then demand for live broadcasting 
has been supplanted. 
B. THE OMITTED HOLDING - § 117 
Although the issue was extensively briefed,162 Judge Smith 
chose not to address the possibility that the adaptations made 
by the Game Genie were protected by section 117. There are two 
arguments for this being an appropriate decision. 
First, the court held the Game Genie did not create deriva-
tive works and had then continued with the alternative fair use 
holding. An alternative to the alternative would have been 
redundant. Second is judicial restraint. Having a firmly root-
ed area of the law on which to base its decision, it is proper for 
courts to avoid reaching issues which need not be decided. 
Such a decision is particularly appropriate here where the 
authority for the fair use doctrine is the Supreme Court163 as 
contrasted with the authority for section 117 which is not 
completely settled and stems from lower courts. 1M 
Another facet of judicial restraint provides a contravening 
principle which indicates that section 117 should have been the 
basis of the court's opinion. Where applicable, court's should 
apply specific rather than general principles. Section 117 was 
162. Galoob's Memorandum in Opposition to Nintendo's Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 17, Galoob, No. 90·1586 & 90-1440 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (WESTLA W 149826, 
Allfeds directory). 
163. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 417; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539. 
164. Foresight Resources, 719 F. Supp. at 1006; Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 255; RA V 
Communications, 1988 W.L. at 36174. 
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specifically tailored to limit the exclusive rights of computer 
program copyright holders. Since it is specifically addressed to 
the problems of copying and altering computer programs, and 
because it is the most recent legislative expression on the 
subject, it supersedes the more general fair use principles 
which would otherwise govern. 
1. § 117 Makes Use of the Game Genie Non-Infringing 
Assuming the Game Genie produces derivative works, 
game owners would be protected from a claim of direct infringe-
ment by section 117's authorization of computer program adap-
tations. 
At the present time authorities hold section 117 should be 
construed broadly165 and have recognized the right to make 
adaptations includes the right to add features. l66 While the right 
to make adaptations was originally restricted to adaptation nec-
essary to enable the use of the program for the purpose it was 
purchased,167 courts no longer consider the reason behind the 
adaptations.16s Arguably the Game Genie fits even the more 
restrictive view because it enables less talented or experi-
enced people to enjoy playing video games. The viewpoint to be 
considered is the family's. Thus the relevant purpose is fami-
ly entertainment, not profit for Nintendo. 
The fact that the Game Genie was created by a third party 
and not the game owners cannot hinder a section 117 defense. 
Foresight noted the right to adapt would be illusory to the great 
majority of consumers if they could not draw upon the talent 
of people capable of adapting computer programs.169 
The weak link in the above argument is that the chronol-
ogy shows Galoob had no authorization prior to marketing 
the Game Genie. This argument falls to the observation that 
the video game player, not Galoob makes the adaptations of the 
game by inputting the codes, Galoob merely provides the 
means by which the average consumer can effectuate the 
changes they wish to make. 
165. RAVComms., No. 88 Civ. 3366 (WESTLAWat 36174, Allreda directory). 
166. [d. at 36177 (citing CONTU Final Report). 
167. [d. 
168. Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 261. 
169. Foresight, 719 F. Supp. at 1010. 
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2. § 117 is Subsumed by the Fair Use Doctrine 
The section 117 exceptions to the exclusive rights granted 
the copyright holder are subsumed by the fair use doctrine. In 
discussing the application of the four fair use factors to section 
117, particular attention will be paid to the right to adapt 
granted in section 117(1). A similar examination would reach 
the same result with regard to the right to make archival 
copies granted in section 117(2). 
a. Purpose and Character 
Section 117 prohibits the transfer of adaptations without the 
authorization of the copyright owner.170 This forces even sim-
ilarly situated persons to make their own adaptations. This 
eradicates any chance for the adaptations to be used in a com-
mercial fashion, i.e., to supplant demand for the original work. 
The adaptations are available only to the owner of the computer 
program who made or authorized them. A finding of noncom-
mercial use establishes a presumption of fair use.l7l 
b. Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
This "critical element"172 supports a finding of fair use as 
well. Section 117 only authorizes the owner of a computer 
program to make or authorize adaptations.17s The fact that 
people other than the copyright holder own copies of the com-
puter program indicates the work is published. 
c. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
For arguments sake we must assume a worst case scenario 
with regard to amount and presume the entire work is being 
used. Use of the entire work formerly carried a presumption 
against fair use. 174 Sony narrowed that presumption by exclud-
ing from its ambit cases where the alleged infringer was enti-
tled to use the entire work. 176 The owner of a computer program 
is entitled to use the entire program with no presumption 
against fair use.176 
170. 17U.S.C. § 117. 
171. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. 
172. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564. 
173. 17 U.S.C. § 117(2). 
174. Leon, 91 F.2d at 486. 
175. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449·50. 
176. [d. 
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d. Effect on the Market 
The relevant inquiry here is restricted to whether the 
adaptation will supplant demand for the copyrighted work. The 
user must first own a copy of the program in order to be enti-
tled to make adaptations. The adaptations cannot be trans-
ferred without the approval of the copyright holder. The 
restrictions eliminate any possibility of the adaptations sup-
planting demand for the copyrighted work. Thus, this factor 
does not weigh against a finding of fair use. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Galoob is a well reasoned, correctly decided opinion which 
adds a significant refinement to the definition of a derivative 
work and follows the tradition set by the Supreme Court for the 
fair use doctrine. A reluctance to pursue copyright infringement 
in the home serves the purpose of disseminating innovation 
without jeopardizing the innovative incentive. 
The court exercised judicial restraint by avoiding issues 
which were thoroughly briefed by the parties but which did not 
need to be addressed. Doing so avoided discussion of section 
117. By following the example set by this case, section 117 need 
not ever be addressed by the courts because, as in this case, any 
adaptation covered by section 117 would be protected as a 
fair use under section 107. 
The effect of this example is to circumvent the intention of 
Congress. Section 117 was enacted to govern copying and 
adapting computer programs. I?? As such, it supersedes the 
fair use doctrine in this area and should have been given 
effect by the courts. While the Congressional action may have 
been redundant in this instance, its intent should be carried 
out as best possible. 
Christopher A. Kesler* 
177. 17 U.S.C. § 117. 
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